Extending decision making competence to special populations: a pilot study of persons on the autism spectrum by Irwin P. Levin et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 28 April 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00539
Edited by:
Andrew M. Parker,
RAND Corporation, USA
Reviewed by:
Maggie E. Toplak,
York University, Canada
Lydia Vella,
University of Birmingham, UK
*Correspondence:
Irwin P. Levin,
Department of Psychology,
University of Iowa, Seashore Hall,
Iowa Avenue, Gilbert Street, Iowa
City, IA 52242, USA
irwin-levin@uiowa.edu
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognition,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 30 December 2014
Accepted: 14 April 2015
Published: 28 April 2015
Citation:
Levin IP, Gaeth GJ, Foley-Nicpon M,
Yegorova V, Cederberg C and Yan H
(2015) Extending decision making
competence to special populations:
a pilot study of persons
on the autism spectrum.
Front. Psychol. 6:539.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00539
Extending decision making
competence to special populations:
a pilot study of persons on the
autism spectrum
Irwin P. Levin 1*, Gary J. Gaeth 2, Megan Foley-Nicpon 3, Vitaliya Yegorova 4, Charles
Cederberg 3 and Haoyang Yan 5
1 Department of Psychology, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA, 2 Department of Marketing, University of Iowa, Iowa City,
IA, USA, 3 Department of Psychological and Quantitative Foundations, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA, 4 Department of
Social Work, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA, 5 Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
The area of decision making has much to offer in our effort to understand special
populations. This pilot study is an example of just such a project, where we illustrate
how traditional decision making tools and tasks can be used to uncover strengths and
weaknesses within a growing population of young adults with autism. In this pilot project
we extended accounts of autistic behavior such as those derived from “theory of mind”
to predict key components of decision making in high-functioning young adults on the
autism spectrum. A battery of tests was administered to 15 high-functioning college
students with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), focusing on decision making competence
(DMC) and other aspects of decision making related to known deficits associated with
autism. Data from this group were compared to data from unselected college students
receiving the samemeasures. First, as a test of a key social deficit associated with autism,
the target group scored much lower on the Empathy Quotient scale. Traditional elements
of decision making competency such as Numeracy and application of decision rules were
comparable across groups. However, there were differences in thinking style, with the
ASD group showing lesser ability and engagement in intuitive thinking, and they showed
lower levels of risk taking. For comparisons within the ASD group, autobiographical
reports concerning individual lifestyles and outcomes were used to derive a scale of Social
Functioning. The lowest scoring individuals showed the lowest levels of intuitive thinking,
the lowest perceived levels of others’ endorsement of socially undesirable behaviors, and
the lowest ability to discriminate between “good” and “bad” risks. Results are discussed
in terms of interventions that might aid high-functioning young adults with ASD in their
everyday decision making.
Keywords: decision making, persons on the autism spectrum, risk taking, perception of social norms, framing
effects
Introduction
The primary goal of this pilot study is to demonstrate how decision making research in general, and
research on decision making competence (DMC) in particular, can advance our understanding of
young adults who are high functioning on the autism spectrum. This group is important to study
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from a practical perspective because of the increasing number
of people diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and
because these young adults are at a time in their development
when life-altering decisions need to bemade.We start by focusing
on the key concepts of theories of autism and generating novel
predictions of how they apply to decision-making behavior. We
then review literature examining ASD from a clinical, applied per-
spective to generate a series of research questions and hypotheses,
and provide preliminary tests in a pilot study.
We feel that recent research on DMC shows great promise
as a tool to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of
special populations. First, it represents a subtle shift from earlier
work on biases and heuristics in emphasizing the positive rather
than the negative side of decision making. Second, DMC research
often focuses more on the individual decision maker and his or
her characteristics, and uses within-subject measures. Third, this
research has emphasized the need to assess the validity of standard
laboratory tasks in predicting real-world decision making and
its consequences (Parker and Fischhoff, 2005; Del Missier et al.,
2012; Weller et al., 2012). We feel that these developments show
great promise for uncovering both the strengths and weaknesses
of special groups of decision makers such as those with ASD.
We start with a brief summary of clinical work describing the
characteristics of the disorder and follow this with our proposed
linkages to decision making processes.
Autism spectrum disorder is a term representing amultifaceted
and diverse set of related neurodevelopmental conditions where
individuals exhibit social communication and behavioral diffi-
culties (Tager-Flusberg, 2007; American Psychiatric Association
[APA], 2013). PersonswithASDhave extremely variable cognitive
and behavioral functioning abilities and this influences how the
core diagnostic symptoms manifest. There currently is no one
theory available to explain the full range of phenotypic presenta-
tions (Tager-Flusberg, 2007; Van de Cruys et al., 2014). However,
one theory in particular, “theory of mind” (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1985), postulates that individuals with ASD display an impaired
capacity to understand the feelings, thoughts, intentions, beliefs,
and potential behavioral reactions of others. Nevertheless, not
all individuals with ASD fail classic theory of mind tasks, such
as the false-belief task (i.e., a test of one’s ability to take the
perspective of someone else), leading some to suggest that basic
perspective-taking may develop later in those with ASD, More
complex aspects, such as understanding accidental harm, may
never fully develop, even in higher functioning populations (Van
de Cruys et al., 2014). Similarly, those who are older or have
higher cognitive functioning may pass the theory of mind tests
by relying on language and other non-social cognitive functions
rather than on social insight to solve the problems (Frith and Frith,
2003).
It has been proposed that the theory of mind construct can be
divided into cognitive and affective abilities that are distinguished
by two distinct neural networks (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2003;
Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007). Cognitive theory of
mind deficits include challenges associated with cognitive flex-
ibility and perspective taking. Affective theory of mind deficits
include the capacity to understand and recognize the emotional
experiences of others, or the ability to experience empathy. In
high-functioning individuals with ASD, the decreased ability to
process the emotional components of social information is inde-
pendent from the person’s normal or above normal cognitive
functioning (Buitelaar and van der Wees, 1997). Given this infor-
mation, scholars suggest that tasks be expanded to include a
wider and more realistic range of social situations to demon-
strate how theory of mind manifests differently as one develops
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Tager-Flusberg, 2007; Scheeren et al.,
2013). In the current study we provide measures of thinking style,
perception of social norms, risk-taking, and reacting to affective
cues.
To elaborate on how these concepts relate to DMC, assessing
thinking style of adults with ASD is consistent with the notion that
understanding another’s perspective involves general deductive
reasoning (McDonald and Flanagan, 2004) and executive func-
tioning skills, which include decision-making (e.g., Carlson et al.,
1998; Carlson and Moses, 2001; Perner et al., 2002; Talwar and
Lee, 2008). Furthermore, some limited data suggest that adults
with ASD may underestimate others’ perceptions of what kinds
of negative behaviors are acceptable. For example, in Moran et al.
(2011) study of moral judgment in adults with ASD and neu-
rotypical adults, the ASD group failed to differentiate accidental
from intentional harms toward others. The authors suggested that
the participants with ASD over-relied on outcomes of actions and
under-relied on intention.
Also central to DMC and its relationship to theory of mind
deficits inASD is the commonly observed strict adherence to rules
and inflexibility in the presence of new and conflicting informa-
tion (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). A related
finding is that persons with ASD tend to take longer to make
decisions and are more likely to report avoidance of decision-
making (Luke et al., 2012; Brosnan et al., 2014). When individuals
are faced with risky situations, they may struggle to take a risk if it
involves their needing tomake a rule violation. That is, individuals
need to both learn from their errors and know when to ignore
errors (Van de Cruys et al., 2014). The inability to be flexible
may translate into difficulty taking risks, even when doing so
would be beneficial. Finally, previous researchers have found that
emotional recognition and theory of mind are correlated such
that individuals with ASD have significantly lower cognitive and
affective empathy than have those without ASD (Mathersul et al.,
2015), and this may impact their ability to make decisions that
involve the interpretation of subjective information.
In addition to establishing a theoretical rationale for select-
ing our target group, a major reason why we focused on young
adults with ASD is that the unemployment rate in this group is
disturbingly high (Ballaban-Gil et al., 1996; Howlin et al., 2004;
Taylor and Seltzer, 2011; Roux et al., 2013; Burgess and Climera,
2014), even in light of advanced degree obtainment (Baldwin
et al., 2014). On the other hand, there are individual examples of
great success such as the extraordinary contributions in animal
science by Temple Grandin (Kalbfleisch, 2013). Prior research
and anecdotal reports have suggested that individuals with ASD
have several unusually strong skills, such as task endurance and
high intensity focus. It is clear that advances in understand-
ing individuals with high-functioning ASD in particular require
a balanced view of ways to build on strengths and overcome
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weaknesses. The measures of DMC are well-positioned to do
this.
Recent work by members of our research team and others
has extended the study of DMC in several ways: (1) sampling
across the age spectrum to demonstrate that the development
of DMC is “an act in progress” (Weller et al., 2012); (2) using
a longitudinal research design to establish the stability of DMC
as an individual differences measure that captures real-world
decision making and its consequences (Weller et al., 2015); and
(3) identifying within and across age groups those individual
dispositional characteristics that account for variance associated
with different components of DMC (Levin et al., 2014). Levin
et al. (2014) showed that specific individual difference variables
were related to different components of DMC, for example, sur-
gency and the ability to discriminate between good and bad
risks.
There has been some limited research on how adults with
ASD differ from controls on specific decision making tasks. For
example, in a study by De Martino et al. (2008) employing a
gambling task, ASD subjects showed a reduced susceptibility to
framing effects as measured by smaller differences than control
subjects in risk-taking to achieve gains and risk-taking to avoid
losses. Furthermore, in support of the proposition that ASDs fail
to incorporate emotional context into the decision process, De
Martino et al. (2008) provided evidence tying insensitivity to con-
textual frame to psycho-physiological evidence (skin conductance
response).
Interestingly, this diminished reaction represents an advantage
to persons with ASD because resistance to framing effects has
been considered as a positive component of DMC. However, in
other contexts, diminished emotional processing can be a deter-
rent to constructive decision making, especially when learning
from experience. Morsanyi and Holyoak (2010) compared chil-
dren with ASD and typically developing children on a battery
of analogical reasoning tasks and found no group differences,
suggesting that the ability to reason systematically with relations
is intact in children with ASD. In the present study we separate
measures of analytic/logical thinking and intuitive/experiential
thinking. If intact reasoning persists until early adulthood, we
would expect no difference between our ASD and control groups
on our measure of analytic/logical thinking.
In an experiential decisionmaking task, the Iowa gambling task
(IGT), Johnson et al. (2006; see also Yechiam et al., 2005) showed
that individuals with ASDwere less responsive to choice outcomes
than were controls, and were more influenced by the attraction
of previously unexplored and irrelevant options. Our measure of
thinking style that separates intuitive/experiential thinking from
analytic/logical thinking is consequently expected to show lower
levels of the former in the ASD group.
Also of interest is decision making under risk because so many
of the life-altering decisions facing high-functioning young adults
with ASD involve the element of risk. For example, “If I take a
full course load, I will graduate sooner but will the pressure be
too great for me?” “Should I move away from my comfort zone at
home to where new opportunities will open up forme, but where I
may not be able to function in a new social environment?” “Should
I take a lower paying job that will allow me to avoid extensive
interpersonal contact or should I reach for a higher paying job that
requires more interpersonal encounters?”
A recent study by South et al. (2011) compared children and
adolescentswithASD to age-matched controls on an experimental
risk-taking task, the Balloon Analog Risk Task. They found no
difference between groups in the summarymeasure of risk-taking.
However, they found interesting differences in the mediators of
risk-taking, leading them to conclude that task performance was
motivated by fear of failure in the ASD group and by sensitivity to
reward in the control group. One shortcoming that they pointed
out was the inability to examine responses to gain and loss tri-
als separately. Our use of multiple tasks will include separation
of risk-taking to achieve gains and risk-taking to avoid losses.
However, their use of individual difference measures to examine
within-group as well as between-group differences is consistent
with the current approach to help inform individualized interven-
tions for persons on the spectrum.
Research Questions and Predictions
Based on the theoretical accounts and prior studies described
above, we formulate the following set of research questions. In
some cases prior thinking leads us to specific predictions for our
measures; in other cases the questions are open-ended.
1. How do the ASD and control groups compare on Recognizing
Social Norms, a set of measures designed to assess the extent
to which individuals personally endorse socially undesirable
behaviors and the extent to which they perceive others to
endorse such behaviors? Based on theory of mind conclusions
concerning ASD deficits in understanding others’ feelings and
intentions, we expect differences in these measures but leave
the direction of difference as an empirical question.
2. How will the ASD group and controls compare on framing
effects? Based on models of autistic behavior that focus on
lowered responsiveness to emotional cues and the findings of
De Martino et al. (2008), we predict lower framing effects in
the ASD group.
3. How do the groups compare on Thinking Style, a set of
measures designed to distinguish analytic/logical thinking
style from intuitive/experiential thinking? Based on earlier
results showing lowered levels of learning from experience and
increased decision times (Luke et al., 2012; Brosnan et al.,
2014), we predict that our ASD group will be lower on mea-
sures of intuitive/experiential thinking but not on measures of
analytic/logical thinking.
4. How do the groups compare on riskiness of decisions, sepa-
rating risks to achieve gains and risks to avoid losses? South
et al. (2011) concluded that in dealing with risk, those with
ASD compared to controls were more motivated by fear of
failure and less by sensitivity to reward. We provide a variety
of measures to examine this question.
5. How do individuals with high-functioning ASD compare with
controls on measures such as Numeracy and Use of Decision
Rules, which are thought to represent cognitive ability and use
of cognitive resources? We have no reason to expect group
differences on these measures but their inclusion may help to
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predict performance on more complex measures of decision
making.
In addition to addressing these five questions by considering
ASD-control group differences, we provide individual difference
analyses to examine the extent to which crucial social functioning
within the ASD group varies as a function of the same factors that
differentiate ASDs from controls.
Methods and Procedure
Participants
As part of what we consider a pilot study, we compared a group
of 15 college-aged students with ASD (13M, 2F; age M = 23.92,
SD = 4.36, range = 18–30) with unselected students for whom
we had prior data on several measures that are used in DMC
measurement. In addition, we assessed through a series of scales
and interviews, the personal and interpersonal aspects of the
lives of our participants with ASD. The combination of these
objective and subjective measures obtained with restricted sam-
pling from a relatively rare population required face-to-face data
collection spaced across two sessions. Thus, in contrast to typical
judgment and decision making research, our emphasis was on
collecting in-depth individual data at the expense of a large sample
size.
The following is the series of checks and balances used in
recruitment and ASD diagnostic verification:
1. Initial recruitment was accomplished through a notice,
approved for standards of ethics by the university’s institutional
review board (IRB), that was sent to all members of a large
Midwestern university describing the need for young adults,
ages 18–28, who have been diagnosed with ASD to participate
in a study of decision making. (IRB approval was given for
all the control subject procedures as well.) Those interested
in participating were told to express their interest through a
response to this email that included their telephone number.
Following the general mailing, targeted mailings were sent to
offices on campus that worked with individuals with ASD.
2. A follow-up call wasmade to interested persons reiterating that
they would be participating in a study of decision making for
adults on the autism spectrum. A few sample questions were
asked. If the answers reflected understanding of the questions
and if the person verified his or her diagnosis, the participant
was recruited for two sessions in the laboratory. Each lasted
from 1 h to one and a half hours for which compensation was
provided (a $25 gift card for completing each session but they
were not told this before coming).
3. When participants arrived in the lab for the first of two ses-
sions, they read through and signed the informed consent
that again described that they were participating in the study
because they “have been identified as on the autism spectrum.”
4. In order to qualify for inclusion in the ASD group, at the
beginning of Session 1 potential participants were required to
complete an oral interview to affirm diagnosis. Specifically,
they were asked to provide details of how and when they
were diagnosed. We employed this strategy given that those
with ASD tend not to lie (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2008; Jaarsma
et al., 2012). Here are some sample responses: “Mild Aspergers,
was misdiagnosed in middle school w/ full Aspergers, was
on high dose of Strattera, was re-diagnosed after high school.
Understood it better.” “Younger autistic tendencies, later it
was Aspergers. First time was 4 years old, reevaluated when
came to Iowa. In 5th grade it was Aspergers.” “Aspergers syn-
drome. Officially in 2004. However, parents suspicious of ASD
much earlier than that. Parents suggested an evaluation. Saw a
psychiatrist.”
Tasks and Measures
Fundamental to the goal of understanding the strengths andweak-
nesses of research participants is collecting information on their
DMC. For present purposes of addressing our research questions
about persons with ASD, we included the following basic mea-
sures of DMC: Numeracy, Applying Decision Rules, Recognizing
SocialNorms, and framing effects.We also included theCupsTask
of risky decision making that assesses the ability to discriminate
between “good risks” in which the expected value (EV) favors
a risky choice over a riskless choice and “bad risks” where the
EV favors the riskless choice over the risky choice (Levin et al.,
2007). We describe each measure in more detail below (see also
Weller et al., 2012, Appendix 1). Added to these decision making
assessments, we included measures of the rational-experiential
inventory (REI, Epstein et al., 1996) of thinking style, and the
Empathy Quotient scale (EQ; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright,
2004) often used to assess deficits in the processing of social
information among persons with ASD.
As an original contribution arising from our use of face-to-face
interview techniques, we use open-ended questions focusing on
participants’ social experiences concerning living relationships:
the quality of personal relations at home, school and work; and
friendship networks. Participants were asked how satisfied they
were in each of these domains and were encouraged to elabo-
rate on any difficulties they were experiencing. Transcripts were
formed and scored by two independent coders on the quality of
social relations, using a 1–5 scale where higher numbers repre-
sented better relations. The two raters were never more than one
point apart and the sum of their scores was used as an individual
differencemeasure of social and interpersonal success abbreviated
here as “social functioning.”
Numeracy
Numeracy is a measure of the understanding and competence a
decision maker has in using numerical information (Lipkus et al.,
2001). Some sample items are: “If the chance of getting a disease
is 10%, how many would be expected to get the disease out of
1000?” “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 total. The bat costs a dollar
more than the ball. Howmuch does the ball cost?” “In a lake there
is a patch of lily pads. Every day the patch doubles in size. If it takes
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it
take for the patch to cover half the lake?” There are 8 items in total
with number correct as the coded score. This scale overlaps with
another popular scale of cognitive ability, the cognitive reflection
test (CRT; Frederick, 2005).
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Applying Decision Rules
This is a measure of the ability and effort employed to utilize
information of varying complexity in a decision matrix to make
the best choice in each of a series of choices between video game
systems. There are seven items in total, ranging from simple to
complex, scored for number correct (Payne et al., 1993; Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007). For each question, participants were asked to
think about how each person makes his or her choice, and then
pick the DVD player they choose. Each of the five options was
given a value of 1 (very low), 2 (low), 3 (medium), 4 (high), or 5
(very high) on each of four attributes displayed in matrix form.
An example of a relatively simple question is, “Which one of the
DVDs would Brian prefer if Brian selects the DVD player with
the highest number of ratings above Medium?” Only one option
clearlymet this criterion and it only required counting the number
of values above 3 in each row. An example of a more difficult
question is, “Tyrone wants a DVD player that either has a Very
High rating for Programming Options, or one that scores at least
Medium on every feature. Which three of the presented DVD
players would Tyrone prefer?” Answering this question requires
attention to more than one criterion.
Framing Susceptibility Measures
Based on a typology of framing effects developed in our prior
work (Levin et al., 1998, 2002, 2014), different types of framing
conditions are generated by different underlyingmechanisms. For
the purposes of this research, two types of framing are included
and analyzed separately. Attribute framing involves describing
an attribute of an object or event in objectively equivalent, but
affectively distinct, terms (e.g., 85% lean ground beef versus 15%
fat ground beef). The impact of the attribute framing effect ismea-
sured as the mean difference in ratings, such as quality, between
the positive and negative conditions on a 1–6 scale averaged over
three items. Risky choice framing is determined by presenting two
choice options that differ in risk-level and that are alternatively
framed in terms of gains or losses (Tversky and Kahneman’s
1981 Asian disease problem using lives saved or lives lost). The
framing effect is measured by the difference in ratings between
the loss and gain versions of the problem [on a 1–6 scale ranging
from “much prefer A” (the riskless option) to “much prefer B”
(the risky option)]. For both attribute framing and risky choice
framing, one version of a problem is presented in session 1 and the
second version is presented in session 2, with the different versions
randomly assigned to sessions. Smaller differences represent lesser
Framing Effects.
Cups Task: Sensitivity to Risk
To measure the decision makers’ sensitivity to risk, we used the
“Cups Task” (Levin et al., 2007). The Cups Task was developed
to separate risk-taking for gains and losses of monetary currency
and to measure the ability to discriminate between “good risks”
where the EV is more favorable for the risky option than the
riskless option and “bad risks” where the EV is less favorable
for the risky option than the riskless option. On each trial, the
participant chooses between an array of cups with a fixed outcome
and an array of cups with uncertain outcome. An example of a
“gain” trial would be a choice between a sure gain of one quarter
versus a chance of winning 2, 3, or 5 quarters under one (of
three) cups or winning 0 quarters under the remaining two cups.
A corresponding example of a “loss” trial would be the choice
between a sure loss of one quarter and a chance of losing 2, 3, or 5
quarters under one (of three) cups or losing 0 quarters under the
remaining two cups. For each type of trial a 3 3 design was used
where the number of cupswas 2, 3, or 5 and the number of quarters
to be won (or lost) by a risky choice was 2, 3, or 5. Some of these
combinations lead to a greater EV for the risky choice and some
lead to greater EV for the riskless side. There were three trials of
each combination. A primary dependentmeasure is the difference
between the number of risky choices made for “good” or what
we call “risk advantageous” (RA) trials and “bad” or what we call
“risk disadvantageous” (RD) trials. Higher differences (RA-RD)
represent greater discrimination of good and bad risks.
Recognizing Social Norms
The recognition or perception of social norms is an assessment
based on responses across the two sessions (Jacobs et al., 1995). In
one session the participant indicated the likelihood of personally
saying that it is okay to performa set of 15 socially undesirable acts,
ranging from not being on time for an appointment, not returning
a borrowed item, and keeping things found in the street, to drunk
driving, using violence to solve an argument, and not telling the
police after witnessing a crime. In another session, the participant
estimated the percentage of his or her peers who would say it is
okay to perform the same act. We felt that this measure might
partially capture a deficit in social perception in terms of what is
socially acceptable and what is not.
Rational-Experiential Inventory
This dual component scale is used to measure preferences in
the way we process information with a focus on the degree to
which a person uses analytic and logical thinking or the extent
to which he or she uses intuition and personal experience to
make decisions (Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini and Epstein, 1999).
Rationality is measured by the Need for Cognition scale (e.g.,
“I prefer complex over simple problems.”) and Experientiality
by the Faith in Intuition scale (e.g., “I trust my initial feelings
about people.”). The rationality component is measured with two
subscales, Rational Ability, which reflects the ability to think
logically and analytically and Rational Engagement, which reflects
reliance on and enjoyment of thinking in an analytical, logical,
manner. The Experientiality component is also measured with
two subscales, Experiential Ability, which is the ability to use
intuitive impressions and feelings, and Experiential Engagement,
which is the reliance on and enjoyment of feelings and intuitions
in making decisions. Pacini and Epstein (1999) demonstrated the
discriminant validity of their two components of REI by showing
that the two subscales were independent of each other, each was
correlated with different components of the Big Five personal-
ity scales, and that the two scales were differentially related to
responding in a game of chance.
Empathy Quotient
This scale measures the degree to which a person shows empathy
(Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004). The scale contains 60
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TABLE 1 | Means and t-tests comparing ASD participants with “controls” on cognitive measures.
Measure (upper/lower limits) ASD (N = 15) mean (SD) Control mean (SD) (Sample) t-value (p)*
Numeracy (0–8) 5.20 (1.97) 4.88 (1.64) (N = 211) 0.72 (0.472)
Applying decision rules (0–7) 5.06 (1.49) 4.41 (1.68) (N = 211) 1.46 (0.146)
Attribute framing effect ( 5 to 5) 0.46 (0.46) 0.33 (0.75) (N = 131) 0.96(0.348)
Risky choice framing effect ( 5 to 5) 0.33 (1.29) 0.80 (2.10) (N = 131)  1.24 (0.229)
Rational ability (0–10) 3.70 (0.80) 3.79 (0.54) (N = 80)  0.42 (0.681)
Rational engagement (0–10) 3.78 (0.83) 3.51 (0.62) (N = 80) 1.46 (0.147)
Experiential ability (0–10) 2.80 (0.85) 3.43 (0.51) (N = 80)  2.78 (0.014)
Experiential engagement (0–10) 2.94 (0.62) 3.43 (0.52) (N = 80)  3.25 (0.002)
Cups task: risk taking on gain trials 12.60 (5.38) 16.95 (6.77) (N = 358)  2.46 (0.01)
Cups task: risk taking on loss trials 14.33 (7.02) 18.08 (5.93) (N = 358)  2.38 (0.02)
Cups task: RA-RD on gain trials 1.33 (3.46) 2.59 (2.89) (N = 358)  1.64 (0.10)
Cups task: RA-RD on loss trials 2.00 (2.53) 1.67 (2.91) (N = 358) 0.43 (0.666)
*t-tests were adjusted for unequal variance where appropriate.
items, 40 of which are relevant and 20 of which are distractors.
Each of the relevant itemswas scored as 1 or 2 points depending on
whether the response was “definitely agree/disagree” or “slightly
agree/disagree.” This scale is often used to screen individuals for
ASD andwas originally developed for theAutismResearchCentre
by Simon Baron-Cohen and Sally Wheelwright (Wheelwright
et al., 2006). Examples include, “I try to solve my own problems
rather than discussing themwith others,” “I am good at predicting
how someonewill feel,” and “Friendships and relationships are just
too difficult.” Scores can range from 0 to 80 (most empathetic).
A study by Dawda and Hart (2000) examined reliability and
validity of the Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (Bar-On,
1997, 2004) in a sample of 243 university students. Results indi-
cated that the EQ domain and component scales had good item
homogeneity and internal consistency. Scores were not unduly
affected by response styles or biases. They reported a meaningful
pattern of convergent validities with respect to measures of nor-
mal personality, depression, somatic symptomatology, intensity of
affective experience, and alexithymia.
Results
We divide our analyses into two parts: comparisons between
participants with ASD (ASD group) and college-age controls, and
comparisons within the ASD group. The former will allow us to
compile profiles of strengths and weaknesses of young adults with
ASD in comparison to controls. The latter will allow us to examine
individual differences within the ASD group that impact decision
making performance.
Between-group Comparisons
Because our goal is to compare the decision making profiles of
young adults with ASD and controls, and because our measures
did notmatch one-for-onewith those used in priorDMCresearch,
we provide separate rather than combined measures. As a pre-
liminary replication of a well-established result, we compare EQ
scores between groups where low EQ is a signature index of ASD.
Scores were in fact quite disparate between groups with little
overlap [MASD = 27.87, SD = 8.85; MControl = 43.65, SD = 9.60;
Mdiff = 15.78, t(68) = 5.73, difference p< 0.0001].
In the first formal set of analyses, we concentrate on those
measures that represent “cognitive” processes plus thinking style.
These comparisons are summarized in Table 1 where different
sample sizes for the control group arise from different available
data sets of college students for the different measures. These
include the following, which have traditionally been considered
as components of DMC: Numeracy, Applying Decision Rules,
and Framing Effects. Based on recent research in our laboratory,
attribute framing effects and risky choice framing effects represent
different balances of cognitive and affective processes, so we con-
sider them separately (Levin et al., 2014). Also included are the
REI measures of thinking style and measures of performance on
the Cups Task, which has the unique features of separating risk-
taking to achieve gains and risk-taking to avoid losses, as well as
the ability to discriminate “good” and “bad” risks within the gain
and loss domains.
Individuals in the ASD group were comparable to controls on
the traditional measures of DMC, and even tended to be a bit
higher on the use of decision rules in decision matrices. The two
groups were also comparable on Framing Effects. While the two
groups did not differ significantly in the magnitude of Framing
Effects, these effects served as important individual difference
variables within the ASD group. This will be discussed in more
detail later.
Robust differences in decision style were revealed by the REI.
Participants in the ASD group showed less ability and engage-
ment than controls in experiential/intuitive thinking style. No
differences were found in rational/deliberative thinking. This set
of results suggests that our target group was less likely to make
decisions based on emotion and intuition but not less likely
to make decisions based on well thought-out deliberations and
calculations.
Performance on the Cups Task likewise revealed some impor-
tant group differences. The ASD group made significantly fewer
risky choices on both trials to achieve gains and on trials to avoid
losses. However, the participants in the ASD group were equally
as likely as controls to discriminate risk-advantageous and risk-
disadvantageous choices on loss trials but were marginally poorer
on gain trials.
Table 2 focuses on behavioral and social measures: compo-
nents of Recognizing Social Norms where for each of a series
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TABLE 2 | t-test results comparing ASD participants with “controls” on social measures.
ASD (N = 15) Control t-value (p)
Self-endorsement of Social norms (0–1) 0.38 (0.26) 0.61 (0.20) (N = 174) 4.17 (<0.0001)
Perception of others’ endorsement of Social norms (0–100) 35.69 (17.12) 42.20 (14.11) (N = 174) 1.69 (0.0938)
Difference between self-endorsement and perceived others’ endorsement of
Social norms (0–1)
0.02 (0.22) 0.19 (0.30) (N = 174) 2.14 (0.03)
TABLE 3 | Pearson correlations within ASD participants.+
| Social
functioning
Social
norms-self
Social
norms-other
Numeracy  0.055 0.432 0.425
Decision Matrix  0.306 0.440 0.070
EQ 0.256 0.027  0.420
Rational ability 0.298 0.526* 0.533*
Rational engagement 0.458 0.614* 0.552*
Experiential ability 0.272 0.100 0.004
Experiential engagement 0.575*  0.030  0.036
Attribute framing effect 0.501  0.278 0.200
Risky choice framing
effect
 0.747**  0.541*  0.538*
Risk in gain 0.06203  0.263  0.413
Risk in loss 0.17638  0.185  0.196
RA-RD in gain 0.676** 0.508 0.433
RA-RD in loss 0.081 0.365 0.336
+All significant correlations were reviewed to ensure a linear relationship. *p < 0.05,
**p < 0.01.
of socially-undesirable acts, participants rate their personal like-
lihood of saying it is okay to perform each act and estimate
the percentage of their peers who would say it is okay. Overall,
participants with ASD, compared to controls, gave lower personal
endorsements of behaviors that violate social norms. They also
tended to give lower ratings of others’ endorsements of these
behaviors but this effect failed to reach statistical significance.
At the individual item level, participants in the ASD group gave
significantly lower ratings than controls for keeping things that
don’t belong to you, not holding the door open for someone, not
being punctual, and not returning calls. Given that participants in
the ASD group were more consistent in self-other judgments than
were controls, their perceptions of others’ undesirable behaviors
warrants further study.
Within-group Comparisons
Here the focus was to determine the extent to which differences
within the ASD group on performance measures can be cap-
tured by dispositional measures. In spite of the common label of
ASD, the relatively small sample size and the restricted range of
scores on scales such as EQ, some interesting inter-correlations
were observed between the various measures. Table 3 focuses on
relations between behavioral measures and their predictors. We
judge themost important results to be those related to our original
“social functioning” measure of how well each person with ASD
functions in the social world based on self-reports of relations
at school, at work, at home, and in presence/absence of friends.
Social functioning was lowest for those showing the lowest levels
of engagement in experiential/intuitive decision making style,
those showing the lowest levels of discrimination between “good”
and “bad” risks but only in the gain domain of the Cups Task,
and those showing the largest risky choice Framing Effects. Per-
sonal endorsement of negative social behaviors and perceptions of
endorsement by others were highest for those showing the highest
levels of rational ability and rational engagement, and lowest for
those exhibiting the highest risky choice Framing Effects.
Although not shown in Table 3, those scoring lowest on social
functioning were also lowest on perceptions of others’ endorse-
ment of negative social behaviors (r = 0.56, p = 0.03) but not
significantly lower on personal endorsement of negative social
behaviors (r = 0.31, p= 0.27).
Discussion
Summary of Key Results
We first summarize what we consider to be the most reveal-
ing results emerging from our pilot study comparing high-
functioning ASD and young adult controls, organized around our
original research questions. These in turn were largely theory-
driven, motivated by the constructs of theory of mind.
RQ1: Consistent with theory of mind notions that persons on
the autism spectrumhave difficulties perceiving social cues,
individuals in the ASD group were less apt than controls
to endorse undesirable social behaviors and they tended to
be less likely to perceive others as endorsing undesirable
social behaviors. The latter was especially true of those with
the poorest social functioning. Interestingly, individuals in
the ASD group showed a significantly greater degree of
coherence between personal endorsements and perceptions
of others.
RQ2: Here we predicted lower Framing Effects for the ASD
group. This was not confirmed but Framing Effects
emerged in within-group analyses (see below).
RQ3: As predicted, participants in theASDgrouphad lower levels
of ability and engagement in experiential/intuitive thinking
style but showed no differences in analytic/logical thinking.
RQ4: Participants with ASD were less risk-taking than controls
but were not significantly different from controls in the
ability to discriminate between good and bad risks. There
was, however, a marginal tendency for the ASD group to be
less discriminating on gain trials.
RQ5: TheASDgroup scored at least as well as controls on the cog-
nitive measures of DMC, namely Numeracy, and Applying
Decision Rules.
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In addition to these tests of differences between groups, within
the ASD group, poor social functioning was related to less engage-
ment in intuitive thinking styles, poorer ability to discriminate
between good and bad risks, but only for risks to achieve gains,
and greater risky choice Framing Effects.
Clinical Implications and Applications
Few researchers have examined decision-making in young adults
in general (Luke et al., 2012), and fewer seek to improve
decision-making skills in the ASD population. While initial inter-
ventions are being developed to help young adults with ASD
gain employment-seeking skills (Strickland et al., 2013), there
is a dearth of research examining how improvements in basic
decision-making abilities and/or inabilities may impact an ASD
individual’s employment or achievement success. However, these
are critical skills for young adults and students with ASD who
need to make good decisions to be successful in life. Additionally,
social skills curriculums exist for young adults with ASD (e.g.,
Baker, 2003; Laugeson andFrankel, 2010) but none are empirically
based or take decision-making strengths and impairments into
consideration.
Here we discuss potential clinical applications of our findings
contingent on the ability to overcome the limitations discussed
below and replicate these findings with larger sample sizes and
a greater array of diagnostic tools. For example, risk taking is an
aspect of decision-making that is complex and highly dependent
on both the situation and individual; thus it is clinically relevant. It
may be that the nuances involved in determining what situations
call for what decisions is lost on the person with ASD; thus, the
individual may be less likely to take risks that would be to their
advantage. Present results show that the poorest functioningASDs
are less apt to discriminate between “good” and “bad” risks involv-
ing possible gains. A potentially useful intervention here would be
to give them examples where taking a risk that may at first seem
undesirable (going for a job interview that is uncomfortable and
with uncertain outcome) can lead to long-term gains (financial
security).
Second, our results suggest that decisions that normally rely
on affect or intuition may be more difficult for individuals with
ASD to make than decisions that rely on deliberative and logical
thinking (see also Yechiam et al., 2005; De Martino et al., 2008;
South et al., 2008, 2011). A potentially useful intervention here
would be to provide examples where excessive deliberation can be
counter-productive such as selecting a place to go out for dinner
or something to wear to work.
Previous research supports the notion that individuals with
ASD are good rule-followers (Attwood, 1998; Hill, 2004; Ster-
poni, 2004; Shulman et al., 2012), which is consistent with the
current results indicating that individuals with ASD performed
well on the Applying Decision Rules and Numeracy measures and
most were able to discriminate between good and bad risks. The
present findings suggest they typically do not endorse undesirable
social behaviors, which is positive, but they may be unrealistic
in recognizing these behaviors in others, which could be prob-
lematic. These identified challenges are consistent with global
deficits many individuals with ASD encounter related to theory
of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994, 1997). Individuals with ASD
are at an increased risk for being taken advantage of in social and
professional settings (Hillier et al., 2007; Wilczynski et al., 2013),
which can be an additional focus of therapeutic intervention. Use
of role-play, rehearsal, and problem-solving can help a therapist
capitalize on the client’s personal ethical code and increase his or
her recognition of when their personal standards are or are not
present in others (Moran et al., 2011).
Based on our preliminary findings and those of others, we
feel it is imperative to individualize intervention for persons with
ASD. Here are some examples: (1) promoting self-advocacy skills
based on the decision maker’s dominant thinking style, which
is more likely to be deliberative than intuitive for persons with
ASD; (2) reframing key life decisions by considering both the
possible gains and possible losses; (3) providing encouragement
and reassurance as individuals take decision-making risks that
are to their advantage; and, (4) providing information for making
realistic assessments of others’ decision making as a model for
their own processes (e.g., it is sometimes okay to be late for an
appointment). By bringing together strengths and complementing
these strengths with tools to overcome weaknesses, we believe
there is the potential to improve the decisions of individuals on
the spectrum and, ultimately, the outcomes of those decisions.
For example, our results suggest that high-functioning persons
with ASD are quite able to use quantitative and multi-faceted
information as decision aids.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
The conclusions from this study were limited by the following:
low sample size (N) for the ASD group, reliance on self-reports
for diagnosis, and exploratory choices for tasks, measures, and
statistics. We discuss each of these in turn.
The low N for the ASD group was the result of recruiting from
a restricted population within a single university and requiring an
extensive commitment of time and effort among the participants.
In spite of a lowN, however, a number of significant findings were
obtained. (One step taken to reduce the incidence of Type II errors
was to not correct for multiple comparisons.) We hope that this
initial degree of success serves as a motivator for future multi-
university, multi-collaborator research tomultiply the sample size.
Of course, expanding the age range and educational status of
potential participants would also serve to increase N. However,
we believe that the focus on high-functioning college students
was warranted in light of the importance of the decisions they are
making at this stage of their lives and the impact of these decisions
not only for themselves but for society that could benefit from
their contributions.
We employed a set of checks and balances for the recruitment
of the ASD group.We have confidence that the steps we took were
the best we could do under the circumstances and led to few if any
false positives. Nevertheless, diagnostic confirmation ultimately
depended on participants’ self-reports. To reiterate a point made
earlier, if some members of our ASD group were not actually on
the spectrum, and,more likely, some in the control groupswere on
the spectrum, then this would have attenuated our observed group
differences. Future research, if it is spread out across institutes,
can focus on recruitment from units within the institute that deal
specifically with ASD and utilize multiple diagnostic tools.
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The tasks andmeasureswe used, because theywere exploratory,
were somewhat arbitrary. What we learned from this pilot study
was which ones hold the most promise for further investigation.
This can lead to a narrowing of survey items and the resulting
shortening of experimental sessions could aid in recruiting. On
the other hand, some of our results suggest measure expansion.
For example, risk-taking differences were found between groups
but these were confined to a small set of decision domains, specif-
ically monetary gambling type choices for the Cups Task. New
research using the multi-domain DOSPERT scale of risk attitude
and risk taking (Weber et al., 2002; Blais and Weber, 2006) might
be especially interesting because it separates social risks from
other types of risks and these may be especially salient for persons
with ASD.
Further suggestions for future research include longitudinal
or prospective research, especially useful for examining the mal-
leability of decision making skills within the ASD group. Fur-
ther successful demonstrations should motivate the judgment
and decision making research community to apply their tasks
and measures to a wider variety of special groups such as per-
sons with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, depression,
Attachment Disorder, Parkinson’s Disease or Alzheimer’s Disease,
each with its own possibly distinct decision making profile. The
new knowledge acquired about these profiles would enhance
our understanding of special groups and increase the efficacy of
interventions and treatments.
Author Contributions
IL and GG designed the study, oversaw its execution, planned
the data analyses, and wrote major sections of the paper. MF
was responsible for those portions of the paper dealing with
the clinical applications and the associated literature review. CC
also contributed to the literature review and aided in participant
recruitment and testing. VY helped refine the survey instruments
and played a major role in recruitment and testing. HY con-
tributed to data analysis and interpretation, and added valuable
insights throughout the project.
References
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, 5th Edn. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
Attwood, T. (1998). Asperger’s Syndrome: A Guide for Parents and Professionals.
Philadelphia, London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
Baker, T. E. (2003). Social Skill Training: For Children and Adolescents with Asperger
Syndrome and Social Communication Problems. Kansas: Autism Asperger.
Baldwin, S., Costley, D., and Warren, A. (2014). Employment activities and experi-
ences of adults with high functioning autism and Asperger’s disorder. J. Autism
Dev. Disabil. 44, 2440–2449. doi: 10.1007/s10803-014-2112-z
Ballaban-Gil, K., Rapin, I., Tuchman, R., and Shinnar, S. (1996). Longitudinal
examination of the behavioral, language, and social changes in a population of
adolescents and young adults with autistic disorder. Pediatr. Neurol. 15, 217–223.
doi: 10.1016/S0887-8994(96)00219-6
Bar-On, R. (1997). Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory: User’s Manual. New York,
NY: Multi-Health Systems Inc.
Bar-On, R. (2004). “The bar-on emotional quotient inventory (EQ-i): rationale,
description and summary of psychometric properties,” inMeasuring Emotional
Intelligence: Common Ground and Controversy, ed. G. Geher (Hauppauge, NY:
Nova Science Publishers), xiv, 277, 115–145.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2008). Autism, hypersystemizing, and truth. Q. J. Exp. Psychol.
61, 64–75. doi: 10.1080/17470210701508749
Baron-Cohen, S., Joliffe, T., Mortimore, C., and Robertson, M. (1997). Another
advanced test of theory of mind: evidence from very high functioning adults
with autism or Asperger syndrome. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 38, 813–822. doi:
10.1111/j.1469-7610.1997.tb01599.x
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., and Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a
“theory of mind”? Cognition 21, 36–47. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8
Baron-Cohen, S., Tager-Flusberg, H., and Cohen, D. (1994). Understanding Other
Minds: Perspectives From Autism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Baron-Cohen, S., andWheelwright, S. (2004). The Empathy Quotient: an investiga-
tion of adults with Asperger Syndrome or high functioning autism, and normal
sex differences. J. Autism. Dev. Disord. 34, 163–175. doi: 10.1023/B:JADD.
0000022607.19833.00
Blais, A. R., and Weber, E. U. (2006). A domain-specific risk-taking (DOSPERT)
scale for adult populations. Judgm. Dec. Mak. 1, 33–47.
Brosnan, M., Chapman, E., and Ashwin, C. (2014). Adolescents with autism
spectrum disorder show a circumspect reasoning bias rather than ‘jumping-
to-conclusions’. J. Autism Dev. Disabil. 44, 513–520. doi: 10.1007/s10803-013-
1897-5
Bruine de Bruin, W., Parker, A. M., and Fischhoff, B. (2007). Individual differences
in adult decision-making competence. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 92, 938–956. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.92.5.938
Buitelaar, J. K., and van der Wees, M. (1997). Are deficits in the decoding of
affective cues and in mentalizing abilities independent? J. Autism Dev. Disord.
27, 539–556. doi: 10.1023/A:1025878026569
Burgess, S., and Climera, R. E. (2014). Employment outcomes of transition-aged
adults with autism spectrum disorders. A state of the states report. Am. J.
Intellect. Dev. Disabil. 119, 64–83. doi: 10.1352/1944-7558-119.1.64
Carlson, S. M., and Moses, L. J. (2001). Individual differences in inhibitory control
and children’s theory of mind. Child Dev. 72, 1032–1053. doi: 10.1111/1467-
8624.00333
Carlson, S. M., Moses, L. J., and Hix, H. R. (1998). The role of inhibitory processes
in young children’s difficulties with deception and false belief. Child Dev. 69,
672–691. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.1998.00672.x
Dawda, D., and Hart, S. D. (2000). Assessing emotional intelligence: reliability
and validity of the Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i) in uni-
versity students. Pers. Indiv. Dif. 28, 797–812. doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(99)
00139-7
De Martino, B., Harrison, N. A., Knafo, S., Bird, G., and Dolan, R. J. (2008).
Explaining enhanced logical consistency during decision making in autism. J.
Neurosci. 28, 10746–10750. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2895-08.2008
Del Missier, F., Mantayla, T., and Bruine de Bruin, W. (2012). Decision making
competence, executive functioning, and general cognitive abilities. J. Behav.
Decis. Mak. 25, 331–351. doi: 10.1002/bdm.731
Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., and Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in
intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
71, 390–405. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.390
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. J. Econ. Perspect. 19,
25–42. doi: 10.1257/089533005775196732
Frith, U., and Frith, C. (2003). Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing.
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 258, 459–473. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2002.1218
Hill, E. L. (2004). Evaluating the theory of executive dysfunction in autism. Dev.
Rev. 24, 189–233. doi: 10.1016/j.dr.2004.01.001
Hillier, A., Campbell, H., Mastriani, K., Izzo, M. V., Kool-Tukcer, A. K., Cherry, L.,
et al. (2007). Two-year evaluation of a vocational support program for adults
on the autism spectrum. Career Dev. Except. Individ. 30, 35–47. doi: 10.1177/
08857288070300010501
Howlin, P., Goode, S., Hutton, J., and Rutter, M. (2004). Adult outcome for
children with autism. J. Child Psychiatry 45, 212–229. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-
7610.2004.00215.x
Jaarsma, P., Gelhaus, P., and Welin, S. (2012). Living the categorical imperative:
autistic perspectives on lying and truth telling—between Kant and care ethics.
Med. Health Care Philos. 15, 271–277. doi: 10.1007/s11019-011-9363-7
Jacobs, J. E., Greenwald, J. P., and Osgood, D. W. (1995). Developmental differences
in baserate estimates of social behaviors and attitudes. Soc. Dev. 4, 165–181. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9507.1995.tb00058.x
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 5399
Levin et al. Decision making competence in autism
Johnson, S. A., Yechiam, E., Murphy, R. M., Queller, S., and Stout, J. C. (2006).
Motivational processes and autonomic responsivity in Asperger’s disorder: evi-
dence from the Iowa gambling task. J. Int. Neuropsychol. Soc. 12, 668–676. doi:
10.1017/S1355617706060802
Kalbfleisch, M. L. (2013). “Twice exceptional learners,” in Critical Issues and Prac-
tices in Gifted Education, 2nd Edn, eds J. A. Plucker and C. M. Callahan (Waco,
TX: Prufrock Press), 269–287.
Laugeson, E. A., and Frankel, F. (2010). Social Skills for Teenagers with Developmen-
tal and Autism Spectrum Disorders. New York, NY: Routledge.
Levin, I. P., Bossard, E. A., Gaeth, G. J., and Yan, H. (2014). The combined role of
task, child’s age and individual differences in understanding decision processes.
Judgm. Decis. Mak. 9, 274–286.
Levin, I. P., Gaeth, G. J., Schreiber, J., and Lauriola, M. (2002). A new look at
framing effects: distribution of effect sizes, individual differences, and indepen-
dence of types of effects. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 88, 411–429. doi:
10.1006/obhd.2001.2983
Levin, I. P., Hart, S. S., Weller, J. A., and Harshman, L. A. (2007). Stability of choices
in a risky decision-making task: a 3-year longitudinal study with children and
adults. J. Behav. Decis. Mak. 20, 241–252. doi: 10.1002/bdm.552
Levin, I. P., Schneider, S. L., and Gaeth, G. J. (1998). All frames are not created
equal: a typology and critical analysis of framing effects. Organ. Behav. Hum.
Decis. Process. 76, 149–188. doi: 10.1006/obhd.1998.2804
Lipkus, I. M., Samsa, G., and Rimer, B. K. (2001). General performance on a
numeracy scale among highly educated samples. Med. Decis. Mak. 21, 37–44.
doi: 10.1177/0272989X0102100105
Luke, L., Ring, H., Redley, M., and Watson, P. (2012). Decision-making difficulties
experienced by adults with autism spectrum conditions. Autism 16, 612–621.
doi: 10.1177/1362361311415876
Mathersul, D., McDonald, S., and Rushby, J. A. (2015). Understanding advanced
theory of mind and empathy in high-functioning adults with autism spec-
trum disorder. J. Clin. Exp. Neuropsychol. 35, 655–668. doi: 10.1080/13803395.
2013.809700
McDonald, S., and Flanagan, S. (2004). Social perception deficits after traumatic
brain injury: interaction between emotion recognition, mentalizing ability,
and social communication. Neuropsychology 18, 572–579. doi: 10.1037/0894-
4105.18.3.572
Moran, J. M., Young, L. L., Saxe, R., Mei Lee, S., O’Young, D., Mavros, P.
L., et al. (2011). Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-
functioning autism. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 108, 2688–2692. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1011734108
Morsanyi, K., and Holyoak, K. J. (2010). Analogical reasoning ability in autistic
and typically developing children. Dev. Sci. 13, 578–587. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2009.00915.x
Pacini, R., and Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential infor-
mation processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phe-
nomenon. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 76, 972–987. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.76.6.972
Parker, A. M., and Fischhoff, B. (2005). Decision-making competence: external
validation through an individual differences approach. J. Behav. Decis. Mak. 18,
1–27. doi: 10.1002/bdm.481
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., and Johnson, E. J. (1993). The Adaptive Decision Maker.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Perner, J., Lang, B., and Kloo, D. (2002). Theory ofmind and self-control: more than
a common problem of inhibition. Child Dev. 73, 752–767. doi: 10.1111/1467-
8624.00436
Roux, A. M., Shattuck, P. T., Cooper, B. P., Anderson, K. A., Wagner, K., and
Narendorf, S. C. (2013). Postsecondary employment experiences among young
adults with an autism spectrum disorder. J. Am. Acad. Child Adoles. Psychiatry
52, 931–939. doi: 10.1016/j.jaac.2013.05.019
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., and Aharon-Peretz, J. (2007). Dissociable prefrontal net-
works for cognitive and affective theory of mind: a lesion study. Neuropsycholo-
gia 45, 3054–3067. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.05.021
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Tomer, R., Berger, B. D., and Aharon-Peretz, J. (2003).
Characterization of empathy deficits following prefrontal brain damage: The role
of the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 15, 324–337. doi:
10.1162/089892903321593063
Scheeren, A. M., de Rosnay, M., Koot, H. M., and Begeer, S. (2013). Rethinking
theory of mind in high-functioning autism spectrum disorder. J. Child Psychol.
Psychiatry 54, 628–635. doi: 10.1111/jcpp.12007
Shulman, C., Guberman, A., Shilling, N., and Baumginger, N. (2012). Moral and
social reasoning in autism spectrum disorders. J. Dev. Disord. 42, 1364–1376.
doi: 10.1007/s10803-011-1369-8
South, M., Dana, J., White, S. E., and Crowley, M. J. (2011). Failure is not an option:
Risk-taking is moderated by anxiety and also by cognitive ability in children and
adolescents diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder. J. Autism Dev. Disord.
41, 55–65. doi: 10.100T/S10803-010-1021-z
South, M., Ozonoff, S., and Schultz, R. T. (2008). “Neurocognitive development in
autism,” inHandbook of Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 2nd Edn, eds C.
A. Nelson and M. Lucina (Cambridge, MA: MIT), 701–716.
Sterponi, L. (2004). Construction of rules, accountability, and moral identity
by high-functioning children with autism. Discourse Stud. 6, 207–228. doi:
10.1177/1461445604041768
Strickland, D. C., Coles, C. D., and Southern, L. B. (2013). JobTIPS: A transition to
employment program for individuals with autism spectrum disorders. J. Autism.
Dev. Disord. 43, 2472–2483. doi: 10.1007/s10803-013-1800-4
Tager-Flusberg, H. (2007). Evaluating the theory-of-mind hypothesis of autism.
Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 16, 311–315. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00527.x
Talwar, V., and Lee, K. (2008). Social and cognitive correlates of children’s
lying behavior. Child Dev. 79, 866–881. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.
01164.x
Taylor, J. L., and Seltzer,M.M. (2011). Employment and post-secondary educational
activities for young adults with autism spectrum disorders during the transition
to adulthood. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 41, 566–574. doi: 10.1007/s10803-010-
1070-3
Tversky, A., andKahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology
of choice. Science 211, 453–458. doi: 10.1126/science.7455683
Van de Cruys, S., Everts, K., Van der Hallen, R., Van Eylen, L., Boets, B., de-Wit, L.,
and Wagemans, J. (2014). Precise minds in uncertain worlds: predictive coding
in autism. Psychol. Rev. 121, 649–675. doi: 10.1037/a0037665
Weber, E. U., Blais, A.-R., and Betz, N. (2002). A domain-specific risk-attitude scale:
measuring risk perceptions and risk behaviors. J. Behav. Decis.Mak. 15, 263–290.
doi: 10.1002/bdm.414
Weller, J. A., Levin, I. P., Rose, J. P., and Bossard, E. (2012). Assessment of decision-
making competence in preadolescence. J. Behav. Decis. Mak. 25, 414–426. doi:
10.1002/bdm.744
Weller, J. A., Moholy, M., Bossard, E., and Levin, I. P. (2015). Pre-adolescent
decision-making competence predicts interpersonal strengths and difficul-
ties: a two-year prospective study. J. Behav. Decis. Mak. 28, 76–88. doi:
10.1002/bdm.1822
Wheelwright, S., Baron-Cohen, S., Goldenfeld, N., Delaney, J., Fine, D., Smith, R.,
et al. (2006). Predicting autism spectrum quotient (AQ) from the systemizing
quotient-revised (SQ-R) and empathy quotient (EQ). Brain Res. 1076, 47–56.
doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2006.01.012
Wilczynski, S. M., Trammel, B., and Clarke, L. S. (2013). Improving employment
outcomes among adolescents and adults on the autism spectrum. Psychol. Sch.
50, 876–887. doi: 10.1002/pits.21718
Yechiam, E., Busemeyer, J. R., Stout, J. C., and Bechara, A. (2005). Using cog-
nitive models to map relations between neuropsychological disorders and
human decision making deficits. Psychol. Sci. 16, 973–978. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2005.01646.x
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Levin, Gaeth, Foley-Nicpon, Yegorova, Cederberg and Yan. This
is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is
permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No
use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 53910
